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Abstract
Chronic kidney failure is a global health issue that can often require a kidney donation.
The supply of available kidneys, however, is limited, leading to a massive international kidney
shortage that is growing rapidly each year.1 In responding to these shortages, perhaps, several
countries have implemented policies that incentivize living kidney donation. Estimating the
impact of these incentive policies on living kidney donations is important if we are to understand
this global health crisis. Although previous studies have discovered a correlation between the
incentivizing policies and living kidney donations, there has been little attempt made to control
for confounding variables. This study estimates the effect of various governmentally
implemented incentive policies on the number of living kidney donors by performing an
econometric analysis using panel data obtained from select international sources. Panel data
methods were used to estimate 14 econometric models to determine the significance of the
polices in question. Overall, three out of the seven policies (or policy bundles) were found to
have a significant positive effect on living kidney donation rates. Before discussing these
empirical processes, this study first catalogs the incentivizing polices that countries have
implemented; it explains why increasing organ donation numbers is critically important; and, it
reviews other studies that have considered this topic.

“Chronic Kidney Disease.” World Kidney Day, 7 June 2019, www.worldkidneyday.org/faqs/chronic-kidneydisease/.
1

Laverty-Smith 10

Chapter 1: An Overview of International Organ
Transplant Policy
1.1 Introduction
Kidney disease effects millions of people worldwide. An estimated 10% of the world’s
population experiences this chronic medical condition.2 While worldwide demand for kidneys
continues to grow at an estimated 8% each year, supply remains devastatingly low, resulting in a
high number of deaths. This shortage has prompted some countries to re-assess their laws and
policies in an effort to identify effective, but nonetheless ethical, incentives that will make organ
donation more attractive to healthy citizens—as well as increase organ availability for the
chronically ill.
For this study, we will use the most recently available and up-to-date annualized data
from Israel, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
Ireland3 to perform an econometric analysis to estimate the impact of mandated policy incentives
on organ supply. Specifically, the analysis will estimate whether incentive policies increase
donor rates after controlling for income and other variables.
The thesis will include a review of the laws, policies and incentives implemented in
Israel, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Ireland in
an effort to ease supply shortages. It builds on the work of Vandana Apte and others who have
demonstrated a correlation between a country implementing policies that provide living organ
donors with various benefits and an increase in the number of living organ donors. Whether the

“Chronic Kidney Disease.” World Kidney Day, 7 June 2019, www.worldkidneyday.org/faqs/chronic-kidneydisease/.
3
While these are not the only countries to have implemented such incentive policies, they are the seven countries
that we could attain data on within the given time frame.
2
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rise in living donations is directly caused by the incentive policies that were implemented is
disputed, but the correlation between the implementation of such policies and the rise in living
donations, indicated below, is clear. Apte’s study was limited by the number of polices analyzed.
By using appropriate econometric models on panel data, our study moves beyond correlation to
establish causation. Additionally, we have added control variables and have used more up-todate data in our research.

1.2 Background
Kidneys filter wastes and excessive fluids from the blood which are then excreted in
urine. CKD refers to the gradual loss of kidney function and is linked to Type 1 and Type 2
diabetes, high blood pressure, smoking, obesity, Glomerulonephritis, intestinal nephritis,
polycystic kidney disease and ageing.4 Kidney failure patients have two treatment options:
•

Transplantation – Utilizing live and deceased donor kidneys. Transplantation is the
preferred long-term treatment with survival rates for transplant recipients over 80% in the
first five years.

•

Dialysis – Is the only alternative treatment available and involves pumping a patient’s
blood through an external circuit for filtration before pumping it back into the body. A
typical hemodialysis schedule is three sessions per week, for three to five hours per
session at a medical facility, or in some instances peritoneal dialysis at home.5

“Chronic Kidney Disease.” Mayo Clinic, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 15 Aug. 2019,
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/chronic-kidney-disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20354521.
5
“Statistics · The Kidney Project.” The Kidney Project, 20 Oct. 2020, pharm.ucsf.edu/kidney/need/statistics.
4
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Approximately 10-15% of the United States adult population suffers from chronic renal failure.
The prevalence is reported as 11% in Australia, 10% in Singapore and 19% in Japan.6 Over two
million people worldwide are estimated to receive treatment with dialysis or a kidney transplant,
yet this number represents only 10% of people who require treatment to remain alive.7 Patients
who receive a kidney transplant before, live an average of 10 to 15 years longer than if they
stayed on dialysis. Younger adults benefit the most from a transplant, but even adults as old as
75 gain an average of four more years after a transplant than if they had stayed on dialysis.8
Currently, in the United States, over 100,000 people are awaiting a kidney transplant.9
Most of them have suffered kidney failure. When this occurs, patients are placed on dialysis.
People on dialysis for longer than five years make up one-fifth of the national organ waitlist.10 In
the United States, dialysis is expensive, costing the Medicare system an average of $90,000 per
patient annually, for a total of $28 billion across all patients compared to organ transplants that
cost $3.4 billion annually.11 In the United States, a person is added to the kidney transplant
waitlist every nine minutes.12 The long waitlist indicates that the demand for kidneys outstrips
their supply. Given the high number of patients and low number of donors, seventeen people a
day die while waiting for a kidney transplant.

Yaghoubi Fard, Safiye, et al. “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Dialysis and Kidney Transplant in Patients with Renal
Impairment Using Disability Adjusted Life Years in Iran.” Medical Journal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran University of
Medical Sciences, 28 June 2016, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4972066/.
6

7

The contribution of chronic kidney disease to the global burden of major noncommunicable diseases. Retrieved
April 13, 2021, from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21993585/
8
“Kidney Transplant.” BIDMC of Boston, www.bidmc.org/centers-and-departments/transplant-institute/kidneytransplant.
9

Organ Donation and Transplantation Statistics. (2016, January 11). Retrieved October 02, 2020, from
https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-Transplantation-Stats
10 Hart, A., Smith, J. M., Skeans, M. A., Gustafson, S. K., Wilk, A. R., Castro, S., Foutz, J., Wainright, J. L., Snyder, J.
J. Kasiske, B. L. & Israni, A. K. OPTN/SRTR 2018 Annual Data Report: Kidney. Am J Transplant 2019; 20 (Suppl 1): 20– 130.
doi: 10.1111/ajt.15672
11 United States Renal Data System. 2018 USRDS Annual Data Report: Epidemiology of kidney disease in the United States.
National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, Bethesda, MD, 201
12 Organ Donation Statistics. (2020, September 20). Retrieved October 02, 2020, from https://www.organdonor.gov/statisticsstories/statistics.html
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This imbalance is not global, however, as other countries have incentivized a myriad of
fiscal, insurance and other arrangements to bridge supply and demand particularly related to
living organ donation—specifically kidneys and livers—shortening waitlist times and decreasing
the number of deaths. Organ transplants save thousands of lives each year. Currently, many of
the live donors are at risk due to an unregulated organ trade that exploits the most vulnerable in
developing countries and complicates legitimate organ donation efforts.

1.2.1 Worldwide Kidney Shortage
According to the World Health Organization, kidney transplants are carried out in 91
countries with approximately 55,000 being performed in 2005. Patient access to kidneys varies
across the world due to cost, medical technical capacity and most commonly, the availability of
organs.13 This kidney shortage is a global problem hampered by sociocultural, legal, and other
factors. In some countries, the problem is exacerbated by the prohibition of the sale of transplant
organs from living donors. The shortage of an indigenous supply of organs has contributed to the
development of the international organ trade, where participants travel internationally to obtain
organs through commercial transactions. The organ trade has been recognized as a significant
health and ethical policy issue across the world. A World Health Assembly resolution adopted in
2004 (WHA57.18) urges Member States to “take measures to protect the poorest and vulnerable
groups from transplant tourism and the sale of tissues and organs.”14

“The State of the International Organ Trade: a Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available
Information.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 4 Mar. 2011,
www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370/en/.
14
“The State of the International Organ Trade: a Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available
Information.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 4 Mar. 2011,
www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370/en/.
13
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Over the past 30 years, many countries have passed legislation prohibiting monetary
compensation for organ donation in favor of altruistic organ donation. The reliance on altruism,
combined with medical advances in immunosuppressive therapies, has resulted in a growing
waiting list for donor kidneys. Unfortunately, supplying organs altruistically only meets a
fraction of the need. Thus, there is a growing trend in some countries to provide individuals who
choose to donate their organs with economic and medical benefits in an effort to make organ
donation more appealing and popular. These countries include Israel, Singapore, the United
Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Ireland. They are adopting the
provision of financial incentives as an alternative to altruistic organ donation.15

1.2.2 Organ Trafficking
The presence of organ harvesting and trafficking remains prevalent, even after many
countries have signed treaties and implemented laws in an attempt to restrict the international
organ trade. With transplant waitlist times growing, and an increased number of people suffering
from kidney failure, the WHO estimates that 10% of the global kidney transplants performed in
2004 were in patients from developed countries who traveled to developing nations to procure
organs—otherwise known as transplant tourism.16 In the case of transplant tourism, patients
travel internationally to receive their organ transplant in another country. A possible explanation
is that the organs these patients require are not readily available in their home country, or their
home country is not adequately set up for organ transplant surgery (e.g., Tajikistan and

Ghods, Ahad J., and Shekoufeh Savaj. “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney
Donation.” American Society of Nephrology, American Society of Nephrology, 1 Nov. 2006,
cjasn.asnjournals.org/content/1/6/1136.
16
Tazeen H. Jafar, Organ Trafficking: Global Solutions for a Global Problem, American Journal of Kidney
Diseases, Volume 54, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1145-1157, ISSN 0272-6386, https://doi.org/10.1053/j.ajkd.2009.08.014.
15
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Azerbaijan).17 In some cases, private health insurance companies subsidize dialysis patients to
travel to foreign countries for them to undergo transplant surgery there. Transplant tourism is
cheaper than bearing the lifelong costs of hemodialysis.18
There are many risks for patients and donors associated with procuring organs through
transplant tourism and other such unregulated pathways. Patients are at high risk of contracting
HIV and other unwanted infections during the procedure. Organ donors who participate in
unregulated markets “are often poorly informed about the procedure, deprived of appropriate
screening and of quality postoperative and continuing medical care, and not compensated as
agreed upon.”19 Countries like Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Philippines, operate “kidney
bazars” that offer transplant packages ranging from $15,000-$150,000.20 Transplant tourism is
popular in those countries where the majority of the population has low-income levels. In these
countries, selling organs is a way for impoverished individuals to provide for their families, pay
off debts, fulfill bride prices, and just make ends meet.
While people who are impoverished have a “choice” about whether to donate their
organs, the experience of the Falun Gong is a more extreme case. An ascetic religious group
outlawed by the Chinese government, members of the Falun Gong have had their organs
harvested unwillingly while imprisoned.21 China may appear to have one of the shortest organ
waitlists, but its citizens do not donate organs for altruistic reasons, and the Chinese government

Broumand, B, and R F Saidi. “New Definition of Transplant Tourism.” International journal of organ
transplantation medicine vol. 8,1 (2017): 49-51.
18
Katrina A. Bramstedt & Jun Xu, Checklist: Passport, Plane Ticket, Organ Transplant, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANT
1698 (2007).
19
Caplan AL, Dominguez-Gil B, Matesanz R, Prior C. Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in
human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs. Joint Council of Europe/United Nations Study; 2009.
20
Tazeen H. Jafar, Organ Trafficking: Global Solutions for a Global Problem, American Journal of Kidney
Diseases, Volume 54, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1145-1157, ISSN 0272-6386, https://doi.org/10.1053/j.ajkd.2009.08.014.
21
David Matas, David Kilgour, Bloody Harvest: Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China, 2009
17
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does not have maximizing incentive policies in place; rather, religious prisoners have had their
organs taken from them unwillingly.

1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation: Reducing Financial Barriers to
Live Kidney Donation – Recommendations from a Consensus Conference22
The American Society of Transplantation held a consensus conference in June 2014 to
identify best practices for live kidney donation. They found that the financial cost associated
with live kidney donation was a source of stress leading to lower donation rates, especially in
those cases when live donors were incurred substantial financial penalties as a result of the donor
process. They analyzed the costs for the organ donor, including out-of-pocket expenses (travel,
lodging, meals parking, dependent care and uncovered medical expenses) with an estimated cost
up to $20,000. For their analysis, they relied upon the 2014 Canadian research by Klarenbach et
al which found that 96% of live kidney donors experienced negative financial consequences
from having participated in a kidney donation. They also reported 47% lost wages.
The conference participants concluded that live kidney donation should be a financially
neutral process; donors should not suffer financial losses as a result of their decision to
participate in a kidney transplant. They recommended the following initiatives:

Tushla, Lara, et al. “Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation: Reducing Financial Barriers to Live Kidney DonationRecommendations from a Consensus Conference.” American Society of Nephrology, American Society of
Nephrology, 4 Sept. 2015, cjasn.asnjournals.org/content/10/9/1696.full.
22
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•

Allocate resources for standardized reimbursement of donor lost wages and incidental
costs.

•

Pass legislation to offer employment and insurability protections.

•

Promote further research to identify systemic barriers to living donation to ensure the
creation of mitigation strategies.

1.3.2 Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other
than Iran or the United States
Apte (2019) reported that the United States has seen a downward trend over the past five
years in the number of organ transplants.23 To address this organ shortage, she argues that the
United States could consider a program that offers living organ donors a reimbursement package
of fiscal and other incentives. In the article, Apte describes the reimbursement packages offered
to living donors in seven countries: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Australia, Singapore, Canada, Ireland,
and New Zealand. Having reviewed the reimbursement packages and the reported increase in the
number of living donors, Apte concludes that there is at least a correlation between the
reimbursement packages and the increase in living donor transplants (at the time of publication it
was too early to determine if this applied to Ireland (2014) or New Zealand (2015)).
In Saudi Arabia and Israel, donor numbers increased by over 100% while Singapore,
Australia, and Canada showed more modest increases. In Australia, the reimbursement package
is not as generous as in the other countries of Apte’s study. Between 2006 and 2010, select
provinces of Canada implemented reimbursement packages for living organ donors. The effect
of these policies on the total number of living organ donors in Canada has been negligible, with

23

Apte, V. (July 2019). Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other than lran or the
United States. Center for Ethical Solutions and The American Living Organ Donor Fund.
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the number of living organ donors having remained static from 2003 to 2012. Apte does not
comment on the situation in Singapore (50% is a significant increase) or Australia, but speculates
that the situation in Canada “illustrates the need for a comprehensive national policy for
reimbursing living organ donors.” 24
Apte concludes that the reimbursement packages in the countries she studied may have
indeed served as a financial incentive for citizens to donate their organs. While there is an
upward trend of living donors in these countries, the overall number of donors relative to the
national population remains small: 571 in Saudi Arabia (population: 34.27 million), 134 in Israel
(population: 9.05 million). The reasons for such low numbers of living organ donors could be
that: a) The policies were not widely publicized; and b) The reimbursement packages do not
provide living donors with enough of a financial incentive.
A limitation of Apte’s study is that she does not include a more general baseline analysis
of the economies of these countries which would have been helpful in determining the impact of
such variables as GDP, income, and Gini coefficient. Greater understanding of baseline would
assist in targeting any future incentives, taking into account different baselines between
countries. For example, for countries that wish to incentivize living organ donation, which
variable will give them the greatest return on their investment under each different economic and
cultural condition? Are donors more willing to donate if travel is reimbursed verses the provision
or reimbursement of childcare? Does this hold true across different countries? Do we know if the
poor, developing countries are even in a position to offer reimbursement packages to living
organ donors? If they are in such a position, is the resulting increase in living organ donors

24

Apte, V. (July 2019). Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other than lran or the
United States. Center for Ethical Solutions and The American Living Organ Donor Fund.
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greater or less than the increase in the wealthier, developed countries, after controlling for these
baseline variables?
Based on Apte’s research, my hypothesis is that a country like the United States—where
there is great economic disparity—would see a dramatic increase in living organ donors if a
generous reimbursement package were offered. If the United States considered offering longterm health insurance, then my projection is that the number of living organ donors would rise
dramatically as the promise of healthcare would motivate individuals without adequate
healthcare to consider donating their organs.

1.3.3 State Incentives to Promote Organ Donation: Honoring the Principles of
Reciprocity and Solidarity Inherent in the Gift Relationship
Levy (2018) describes the importance of state incentives to counterbalance the “chronic
organ shortage.”25 She focuses on public policy incentives that countries either have, or could,
implement. Having proposed a hypothetical case, Levy argues that the ethical considerations
surrounding financial incentives would likely undercut any small gains to the number of living
organ donors achieved through such an incentive program. Bridging the gap between the
analytical framework of state incentives in organ donation and the reality of normative
constraints, Levy concludes that altruism, as opposed to financial gain, should be the main
reason people donate their organs.
Levy’s research is important for my thesis because it addresses the ethics of incentivizing
organ donation. While national and state financial incentives may seem like an appropriate
solution to the problems created by transplant tourism and the risks involved with long wait

25

Levy, M. (2018). State incentives to promote organ donation: Honoring the principles of reciprocity and solidarity
inherent in the gift relationship. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 398-435.
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times, governmental policies such as allocation priority, tax breaks, and health insurance
coverage, are likely to play a role in the exploitation of financially insecure citizens, making
them willing to treat their body as material resources to be exchanged for financial gain. Not
only do the living organ donors risk their overall health, but they are coopted by an ethically
dubious policy that exploits the poor in the interests of the rich.
A limitation of Levy’s study is that she only focuses on one county, namely Israel. In
much of the article, she engages in the hypothetical consideration of implementing incentivizing
packages. Her argument would be more compelling and persuasive had she decided to illustrate
her hypothetical generalizations about the ethics of incentive policies with real-life examples.
While the altruistic argument is important, the lack of quantitative analysis limits the reader’s
capacity to extrapolate to other contexts.

1.3.4 Reducing the Shortage of Transplant Kidneys: A Lost Opportunity for
the US Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
In the article, “Reducing the Shortage of Transplant Kidneys: A Lost Opportunity for the
US Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)”, Frank McCormick, Philip J. Held,
Glenn M. Chertow, Thomas G. Peters, and John P. Roberts consider the impact of President
Trump’s “Executive Order on Advancing American Kidney Health” proposed in July 2019 and
the subsequent rule amendment to the regulations to enact the National Organ Transplant Act of
1984. McCormick laments that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) recent attempts through attempts at
implanting the changes. While the recommendations for breaking down financial barriers that
discourage donations, and the other disincentives to living donors, were all taken into account, it
was concluded that the non-aggressive approach adopted by the United States will only increase
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kidney donations in the neighborhood of 2,000 per year, instead of the requisite 15,000 per year
(McCormack,1). McCormick discusses some the more robust strategies that these organizations
could implement.
The HRSA followed the minimum requirements listed in the executive order including
reimbursement of lost wages, as well as childcare and elder care for living donors. They also
raised the income ceiling on donors eligible for reimbursement. Following the federal poverty
guidelines, they increased the threshold from 300% to 350% (McCormack, 1). The argument is
that this will only increase organ donations around 9% in part because it only removes the
financial barrier for low-income donors. McCormack notes that if the government would put
more money toward removing financial barriers, they would spend less on dialysis treatment,
saving more money overall. As mentioned earlier, the cost of dialysis for an individual suffering
from organ failure is four times higher than the cost of a kidney transplant.
McCormack also documents other barriers to living organ donation including, the risk of
dying during transplant surgery, the pain and discomfort of the surgery, a decrease in the longterm quality of life due to kidney removal, and the concern that a relative or friend might need
the donor’s kidney in the future (McCormack 2.). It is in light of these barriers that McCormack
recommends insurance policy reform: it should provide greater coverage for death, disability,
and long-term health problems arising from an organ donation. He supports donor tax credits of
$6,500 and concludes that the HRSA should promise to provide a kidney for a specific person of
the donor’s choosing in the future. What we learn from McCormack’s study is that the United
States’ organ donation incentives fall short compared to those of other countries. The effects of
removing financial, emotional, and physical barriers for living donors could greatly increase the
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number of kidney donations in the United States and save the government millions by scaling
back its over-reliance on dialysis treatment.
A limitation of McCormack’s study is that the data used as the basis for the analysis is
relatively old. This limits the utility of the analysis for a critique of the 2019 executive order. For
my regression analysis, I use data as recent as 2019. As many of the organ donation policies are
quite modern, it will be interesting to compare the results of McCormack’s analysis to mine. In
particular, it will show if the trends are stronger as the policies have been in place longer.

1.3.5 The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant
Tourism
In the article, “The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant
Tourism”, Indian J. Nephrol notes that, due to the almost static organ supply, the World Health
Organization called for action to be taken against the exploitation of vulnerable people in organ
trafficking. Thus, a Summit Meeting was held in 2008 in Istanbul consisting of over 150 global
representatives including politicians, scientists, and philosophers. The principles decided upon
during the summit represent an international commitment to improving organ donation and
transplant policies. Nephrol writes, “Access to healthcare is a human right but often not a
reality.”26 Due the rising shortage of organs, and extreme poverty in many countries, individuals
have become increasingly desperate to survive and will do anything necessary to make ends
meet. Such desperation proves a fertile ground for the unethical practices of organ trafficking
that the declaration deals with.

“The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3
(2008): 135-40. doi:10.4103/0971-4065.43686
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Nephrol credits the participants of the summit with formally defining and determining the
parameters of organ trafficking, transplant commercialism, and transplant tourism. The summit’s
resulting declaration offers six key recommendations:
1. National governments, working in collaboration with international and non-governmental
organizations, should develop and implement comprehensive programs for the screening,
prevention and treatment of organ failure.
2. Legislation should be developed and implemented by each country or jurisdiction to
govern the recovery of organs from deceased and living donors.
3. Organs for transplantation should be equitably allocated within countries or jurisdictions
to suitable recipients without regard to gender, ethnicity, religion, or social or financial
status.
4. The primary objective of transplant policies and programs should be optimal short- and
long-term medical care.
5. Jurisdictions, countries and regions should strive to achieve self-sufficiency in organ
donation by providing a sufficient number of organs for residents.
6. Organ trafficking and transplant tourism violate the principles of equity, justice, and
respect for human dignity and should be prohibited.27
The following strategies were recommended as fair and just ways to increase the donor pool and
limit dangerous donation practices:
•

Remove obstacles and disincentives to deceased organ donation.

•

Mechanisms for informed consent should incorporate provisions for evaluating the
donor's understanding.

“The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3
(2008): 135-40. doi:10.4103/0971-4065.43686
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•

All donors should undergo psychosocial evaluation.

•

Health and/or life insurance coverage and employment opportunities of persons who
donate organs should not be compromised.

•

Legitimate expenses that may be reimbursed, including but not limited to, the cost of any
medical and psychological, long-distance telephone calls, travel, accommodation, and
lost income in relation to donation.28

1.3.6 Additional Literature for Consideration
For additional context, the supply of voluntary organ donations is severely inadequate
relative to demand. While demand for organ donations is steadily rising the supply stays static.
This is not only the case with kidneys but all living organ donations.
There has long been debate over the feasibility and ethics of establishing a free organ
market to mitigate this severe shortage. For example, proponents argue that an individual
should be able to sell the rights to their organs either upon death or in a live donation. The sale
of organs is prohibited almost everywhere in the world and the majority of political sentiments
is against legalization of an organ market29. A brief summary of the positions and argument in
favor of an organ market can be found in Henry Hausmann’s article “The Economics and
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs.” The primary argument proposed is that a highly
regulated and ethical market of live donor organs would help address the severe shortage of
donor organs and therefore save lives. This paper takes a firm positions in favor of creating a
legal market for human organ donations.

“The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3
(2008): 135-40. doi:10.4103/0971-4065.43686
29
Hansmann, Henry. The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs.
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/132072593.pdf.
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In this section, I have reviewed the literature relevant to my study of organ donation
policies and their impact on living donor rates. In the next section I define financial incentives,
non-financial incentives, and disincentives, followed by a summary of the incentive policy
packages offers by Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and
the United States.

1.4 Incentive Policies
To offset the dearth of donor kidneys, countries are implementing policies intending to
resolve or dismantle the barriers deterring individuals from living kidney donation. These
policies are seen as an adjunct to altruism and designed to increase the availability of donor
organs. The policy variables in the model are summarized in Table 3.

1.4.1 Incentive and Disincentive Definitions
Financial Incentive — A financial incentive is the provision of something of material value to
motivate consent for organ removal and may include direct payment for organs. It is more
prevalent on the black market or indirectly through tax deductions, reimbursement of lost wages,
medical cost, and childcare.
Non-Financial Altruistic Incentives — These donors are motivated by selfless concern for the
well-being of other citizens. Altruistic kidney donation is also known as “good Samaritan
donation” which is the act of donating an organ for no specific recipient.
Disincentive — Disincentives are the direct and indirect factors that living donors, researchers,
and policy makers identify as disincentives to donating. Such disincentives include:
•

Lost wages for donor support

•

Use of employer-sponsored paid time off
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•

Effect on insurability

•

Effect on employment stability

Direct Costs
•

Transportation to transplant center for testing, surgery, and follow-up care

•

Food, lodging, and incidentals for donor-related support

•

Dependent care

•

Uncovered medical expenses

Below is the breakdown of each country’s incentive policy packages.

1.4.2 Australia
Australia implemented its living organ donation program in 2013 in response to a
decrease in donor numbers. Through the Australian Department of Human Services, the program
provides financial support for post-surgery recovery leave. This program was then picked-up by
the Australian Department of Health in 2015 and renamed The Supporting Leave for Living
Organ Donors Program. The program provides:
•

Loss of Earnings — Compensation for living donor’s lost income for a full nine weeks
post-op. The reimbursement is based on up to 342 hours of paid leave at the national
minimum wage of $656.9 Australian dollars per week, or the donor’s current salary.30
Funds are distributed through reimbursing the employer.

•

Travel and Child Care Expenses — The program reimburses out-of-pocket expenses
associated with donation, including childcare and travel expenses.

Australian Government Department of Health. “Supporting Living Organ Donors Program.” Australian
Government Department of Health, Australian Government Department of Health, 27 May 2020,
www.health.gov.au/initiatives-and-programs/supporting-living-organ-donors-program.
30
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1.4.3 Ireland
Ireland’s Department of Health put into effect its Policy on the Reimbursement of
Expenses of Living Kidney & Liver Donors in 2014. This policy states that all Irish donors are
eligible for reimbursement of all costs associated with donating. These include:
•

Loss of Earnings — Incurred by an employed donor or a self-employed donor for up to
twelve weeks pre/post-donation.

•

Travel Expenses — Donors are reimbursed for costs associated with travel and
accommodation.

•

Child Care — Child care costs are also reimbursable.31

This incentive policy is unique because it subsidizes international travel, enabling a donor that is
outside of Ireland to travel to the country and donate an organ to an Irish national. The organ
donor’s international travel costs and accommodation are reimbursed by HSE’s Living Donor
Reimbursement Office in accordance with the Irish-donor laws.

1.4.4 Israel
Israel passed the Organ Transplantation Law in 2008 to increase the incidence of living
donor transfers. It established a three-tier point based priority system. Individuals are given firsttier priority to organs if they themselves are a living donor or they have a first-degree deceased
donor relative. The second tier is for those that register themselves as a donor. The third-priority
is designed to provide a clear incentive to patients who have first-degree family members that are
registered as donors. This priority system provides a clear incentive based on both altruistic and

“Policy on the Reimbursement of Expenses of Living Kidney & Liver Donors.” An Roinn Sláinte Department of
Health, www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/acute-hospitals-division/organ-donation-transplant-ireland/living-donorprogramme/doh-policy-on-the-reimbursement-of-expenses-of-living-kidney-liver-donors.pdf.
31
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self-interested motives. This tiered priority system is unique to Israel and is the first priority
system to be put into effect globally. It was hoped that a flow on effect of this approach would
help to lower the incidence of transplant tourism and organ trafficking.
Other features of the Israel organ donor law are less individually incentivized and more
geared towards eliminating existing financial barriers and offering medical protection for the
donor such as insurance. Key provisions of the Organ Transplant Law include:
•

Loss of Earnings — The cornerstone financial incentive is reimbursement for lost
earnings. This funding is in place to offset the loss of income experienced by the donor
related to preparing for and recovering from surgery. The government pays the donor for
up to 40 days of medical unemployment benefit.

•

Travel Expenses— A refund is provided to the donor for travel expenses. This covers the
donor’s travel expenses to and from the surgery center.

•

Recovery Leave — A financial incentive under this law is the provision of recovery
leave. The government will pay for a seven-day stay in a hotel.

•

Behavioral Health — There is a refund for up to five psychological treatments
undertaken up to 48 months after the organ donation.

•

Medical Insurance — The plan also offers private medical insurance for up to five years,
the loss of work insurance for five years, and life insurance for up to five years.

1.4.5 Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia passed a law in 2007 stating their reimbursement policy for living donors.
This comprehensive program was passed to reduce the large number of Saudis participating in
transplant tourism and to move the country toward greater self-sufficiency where human organs
are concerned. Approximately 400 kidney transplants are performed in Saudi Arabia annually,
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however about 600 Saudis still travel abroad to source their kidneys, mainly from Pakistan,
Egypt, and India.32 The Saudi Arabia law provides the following incentives:
•

Loss of Income — Reimbursement for lost income.

•

Travel Expenses — Reimbursement of travel expenses associated with donation.

•

Life-Time Medical Care — Donors are provided with life-time medical care regulated at
the national level.

•

Monetary Reward — Donors receive a one-time payment equivalent to about $13,300
(US).

•

The King Abdul-Aziz Medal — Donors are awarded the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the
third degree.

•

Travel Discount — Donors are provided with a discount card giving them 50% off Saudi
Arabian Airlines tickets for a lifetime.33

The Ministry of Health and Saudi Center for Organ Transplantation are responsible for enforcing
and administrating the policy. Because this policy offers a direct monetary reward for an organ
donation, there are strict regulations in place to confirm the donor’s healthy physiological state
and to ensure that they are making a free and independent choice.

1.4.6 Singapore
The Singaporean government passed the Human Transplant Law (HOTA) in 1987
outlawing organ trade and trafficking. It was amended in 2009 to include provisions intended to

“Dilemma over Live-Donor Transplantation.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 4 Mar.
2011, www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/1/07-020107/en/.
33
“Benefits for Organ Donors.” Saudi Arabia for Organ Donations, www.scot.gov.sa/en/Article/Index?pageid=16.
32
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encourage organ donation. Every Singaporean citizen that is not disabled, or has opted out of
HOTA, falls under the purview of this law. Key provisions enacted under this legislation include:
•

Travel Expenses — All travel expenses associated with the donation process are
reimbursed.

•

Loss of Earnings — Reimbursement costs associated with the surgery, including
accommodation, domestic help or childcare, and loss of earnings so far as are reasonably
or directly attributable to that person supplying any organ from his body.

•

Medical Insurance — Includes any short- or long-term medical care or insurance
protection of that person who is or may reasonably be necessary as a consequence of his
supplying any organ from his body.”34

1.4.7 United Kingdom
The Human Tissue Act of 2004 regulates living organ donation across England, Northern
Ireland, and Wales; (Scotland follows its own set of regulations regarding living tissue donations
and removal). This act explicitly outlines that these reimbursements are not a reward for
donation; paying the donor directly for donating an organ is illegal. Financial incentives in the
act provide for the following:
•

Loss of Earnings — Reimbursement to the donor for loss of income for up to 12 weeks
post-surgery.

•

Travel and Child Care Expenses — All costs associated with travel and childcare are
reimbursable by The National Health Service.

1.4.8 United States

34

Human Transplant Act, Part IV

Laverty-Smith 31
In September 2020, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Health
and Human Services Department released final rules removing financial disincentives to living
organ donation. The rules amend the regulations implementing the National Organ Transplant
Act of 1984 and expand the scope of reimbursable expenses incurred by living organ donors with
the goal to reduce the number of individuals on the organ transplant waiting list by increasing the
number of organs available for transplant. The criteria for reimbursement are based on the
incomes of both the recipient and the donor. The revision allows for living organ donors to be
reimbursed for:
•

Donor Evaluation — Expenses associated with donor suitability.

•

Loss of Earnings — Loss of wages are an appropriate reimbursable expense.

•

Medical Expenses — Hospitalization for the living donor’s surgical procedure and
medical follow-up, clinic visits, or hospitalization within two calendar years following
the surgical procedure.

•

Child Care and Elder Expenses — Reimbursable non-medical incidental expenditures.
Having reviewed the incentive policies of Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia,

Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, I now frame an economic model of the
market for kidneys.

1.5 An Economic Model of the Market for Kidneys
Incentives for organ donation fall under two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic. Altruistic
donation is an intrinsic act, in the sense that the donation is made out of the goodness of the
donor’s own heart. Governmental policies that encourage living organ donation provide extrinsic
incentives. Rather than purchasing organs, extrinsic incentive policies reimburse donors for
expenses pertaining to the donation process, hopefully leaving the donor in a financially neutral
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position. The financial barriers associated with the cost of donating are meant to be removed. It
is predicted that rational, utility-maximizing individuals will respond positively to the
reimbursement, leading to an increase in organ donations.
Figure 1 illustrates this simple logic. The value of the extrinsic benefit (positive or
negative) from organ donations is measured on the vertical axis, which we call the “price” and
interpret as the price received by the donor. The quantity of organs supplied is represented on the
horizontal axis. The supply of organs (S1 or S2) will include positive quantities of organ
donations at negative prices if rational preferences defined over organ donation include altruism,
as explained above (see 1.2.1). The demand for organs is represented in Figure 1 as perfectly
inelastic for two reasons. First, the quantity of organs demanded may change very little with
price due to few available substitutes for organs and an inconsequential income effect over the
relevant (low) price range depicted in Figure 1. Perhaps more importantly, however, an increase
in the price received by donors from a policy may have a very small effect on the price paid by
recipients for that same organ. If the price paid by recipients does not change, then the perfectly
inelastic demand curve simply represents the quantity demanded at the unchanged price paid by
recipients.
Assume the price received by organ recipients in the absence of any policy is P1. At this
(negative) price, the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity supplied, and the market incurs a
shortage of organs. A policy that reimburses donors for expenses incurred serves to increase the
price from P1 to P2. It should be noted that a policy that completely reimburses donors will
result in a price of zero (P2 is drawn slightly above zero only to distinguish the price line from
the horizontal axis to improve clarity).
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The slope of supply curve is the focus of this empirical investigation. S2 reflects a very
small increase in organ donations from a policy that increases the price received from P1 to P2.
S1 models a more robust increase in organs in response to the policy. Whether the policy
eliminates the shortage is a topic beyond the scope of this research. Certainly, if the supply curve
is estimated to be something like S1 rather than S2 (with no impact on demand or the quantity
demanded), then the shortage will decrease (the after-policy shortage is not illustrated in Figure
1). It should be noted that it remains beyond the scope of the research to estimate the actual slope
(or elasticity) of the supply curve because the treatment variables are not prices but
incentives. Instead, the results estimate how an undefined change in price affects the quantity
supplied.

Figure 1. The Effect of Policy on Living Kidney Donations (Supply/Demand)
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Chapter 2: Data
2.1 Data on Organ Donations
Table 1 summarizes the source of the organ donation data and provides a description of
the government or organization (funded by the government) responsible for collecting the data.
The HSE which collected the data for Ireland is the only organization that is not transplant/organ
specific. HSE covers all health-related sectors for Ireland. All other organizations specialize in
gathering organ donation data.
Data are aggregated across each country (Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The data covers the period of 2004 to
2019 for all countries excluding Singapore, which ranges from 2010 to 2019. While data was
available for all countries on organ donation numbers for 2020, certain control variables were not
available. The COVID-19 pandemic may have impacted donation numbers in ways our control
variables cannot identify.
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Figure 2. Organ Donations per Millionth across Years and Countries

Figure 2 summarizes the quantity of organ donations over time in the sample of countries
in this study. Israel and Saudi Arabia have the largest increase of organ donations over this time
span. The United Kingdom and Ireland appear to have peaked in 2013 and 2017, respectively.
Organ donations in the United States declined for many years before beginning to increase in
2018—the year that their incentive policy went into effect.

2.2 Treatment Variables
Table 3 summarizes the policy variables discussed in section 1.4. There are seven
treatment variables, each corresponding to a policy variable. The first treatment variable is
TravelExp. This is the treatment variable associated with donors being reimbursed for costs
associated with travel expenses and accommodation. The reimbursement of travel expenses is
the most abundant treatment variable, occurring 65.18% of the time in the sample. The second
variable is LossofEarn. This treatment variable is the cornerstone of the financial incentive. This
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funding is in place to offset the loss of income experienced by the donor related to preparation
for, and recovery from, the surgery. The government will pay the donor for lost income ranging
from 40 days to 12 weeks depending on the country’s policy. The third variable is MedInsur
which covers the policy whereby living organ donors are provided with medical care. This
ranges from short- or long-term medical care, or insurance protection of that person. Depending
on the country, the donor may even be entitled to a lifetime coverage plan that covers all medical
expenses incurred by the donor. The fourth treatment variable, Incent1 bundles three policies
unique to Saudi Arabia: donors are awarded the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the third degree; they
are provided with a lifetime discount of 50% off all Saudi Arabian Airlines tickets; and, they are
given a one-time payment of $13,000 (US). These three variables are perfectly correlated in the
sample, and so only one can be used in the analysis. The estimated coefficient on Incent1
measures the effect of all three policies on living organ donation rates. The fifth treatment
variable, Incent2, bundles policies unique to Israel to avoid perfect correlation. These policies are
refunding the donor for up five post-operative psychological treatments (valid for 48 months
after the operation); providing loss of work insurance for five years; and providing life insurance
for up to five years. This treatment variable also includes Israel’s three-tier point based priority
system (see 1.4.4). This is the least treatment variable which appears 10.71% of the time. The
sixth variable is ChildCare, which refers to the reimbursement of childcare expenses. The
seventh and final treatment variable we included was RecovLeave, which relates to the policy of
offering donors a period for recovery ranging from a paid seven-day hotel stay to a longer period
of paid leave.
These treatment variables are all dummy variables, also known as binary variables. They
take either a value of “0” or “1”: “1” if the country has that policy in effect that year; and a “0” if
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that policy is not in play. If a policy was put into effect mid-year, we would mark it as a “0” for
that year and a “1” for the following year. The creation of these dummy or binary variables
allows us to use these categorical variables in our regression analysis.

2.3 Control Variables
The data for the control variables was sourced from TheGlobalEconomy.com, a respected
source specializing in providing data for researchers, businesses, and individuals with an interest
in given economic indicators. The data are collected from multiple official sources including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Economic
Forum.35 A group of 13 indicators was selected as control variables for the panel data regression
model that would best control for outside influences in the outcome. Table 2 lists and defines the
control variables used in our model, including economic indicators, indicators representing
technological advances, political corruption indicators, religion indicators, health related
indicators, and inequality indicators.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of these control variables. An important note is that
these numbers are based on 112 observations. Looking at the GDP per capita in billions of US
dollars, the minimum is 2.41 per capita in billions and the maximum is 4.37 per capita in
billions. It is possible to observe from these values that the identified countries range widely with
respect to their wealth. This is important for the analysis as it mirrors the world as a whole.
Ireland has the maximum GDP per capita in the sample recorded in 2019 compared with Saudi
Arabia in 2004 with the minimum.

35

“Global Economy, World Economy.” TheGlobalEconomy.com, www.theglobaleconomy.com/.
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Another key value to look at is the unemployment rate, a primary economic indicator of
the overall health of an economy representing the share of the labor force that is without work
but seeking employment. The highest unemployment rate recorded is 15.45% in Ireland from
2012 which is significantly higher than any other unemployment rate for other countries and
years. This disparity indicates Ireland is unable to generate enough employment for its citizens,
that is, the people looking for work outnumber job availability. This value decreases significantly
over the years and in 2019 is recorded to be 4.95% which is below the average of 6.23%.
The Rule of Law Index measures how much confidence agents have regarding citizens
actually being willing to follow the law. Index calculation considers the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, law enforcement police, and the justice system, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, where 2.5 indicates that citizens have
a high confidence in the laws being adhered to and followed. Saudi Arabia (2005) has the lowest
rule of law index, -0.1. In subsequent years, Saudi Arabia’s rule of law index is significantly
lower than other countries, which makes sense if one considers the high incidence of illegal
transplant tourism.
We will also pay special attention to health spending: the current expenditures spent by
countries on health per capita in current US dollars. The United States has the highest health
spending, with $10,623.85 recorded in 2018 and 2019, in line with the fact that they are the
largest economy, based on GDP. We only need compare the health spending in the United State
with $400.88 spent by Saudi Arabia in 2004.
The Gini coefficient is a method for controlling for inequality in a country that measures
the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals deviates from a perfectly equal
distribution. Ranging from 0 to 100, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index
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of 100 implies perfect inequality. Saudi Arabia and Singapore have the highest Gini coefficient,
45.9, which is about 6 points above the mean, and 15 points greater than the minimum Gini
recorded for Ireland. Of the seven countries, Saudi Arabia and Singapore have the highest
inequality in terms of income distribution. Given that the Gini coefficient is missing for some
years, the value from the measured years value is copied to the unmeasured years to preserve
data points.
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Chapter 3: Regression Analysis
3.1 Objectives
In Section 1.5, the theoretical effect that the price has on organ shortages is described as
it relates to supply and demand. To demonstrate this relation in an analytical setting, the research
objective is to explore the influence of different incentive policies on living kidney organ donor
numbers, while controlling for certain population variables. To achieve the research objective,
we run a fixed effects and random effects panel data linear regression model using time-series
data to predict organ donor numbers from a combination of country wide control variables and
incentive variables. This chapter details preliminary exploratory data analysis and the selection
process. Following the presentation of the resulting models, interpretations and limitations of this
analysis are discussed, along with what the results mean for countries considering implementing
incentive policies.

3.2 Methods
All regression analyses were run in Stata 12.1 statistical software using data imported
from a Microsoft Excel document with compiled data collected from sources listed previously. A
linear regression test with panel data was conducted. This was achieved using a fixed effects
estimator and a random effects estimator for each policy variable.36
We next calculate the coefficient value to determine the size of the impact the variable
has on donation numbers, while taking into account the t-value for fixed effects, the z-value for

36

We tried to conduct a series of Hausman tests on each pair of fixed/random effects models to test which estimator
was the best fit for the data. While the fixed effects model eliminates possible bias from ai, the random effects model
is preferred, as it makes better use of the data by exploiting the variation between the seven countries. However, due
to a lack of data points we were unable to run the tests.
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random effects, and the p-value to see the significance of the variable in that model. We also
looked at the overall, within, and between values of R2 to see how much variability the model
accounts for or how well the model fits the data.

3.2.1 Model
For our regression analysis this is our proposed model:
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗 + ∑𝜃𝑘 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,7 𝑡 = 2004, 2005, … ,2019 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,7 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,13
In this model 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗 represents our treatment variables and 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑘 corresponds to our control
variables. The “i” represents each of the seven countries (Australia, Israel, Ireland, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States), “t” is the year ranging from 2004 to
2019, “j” is the seven treatment variables (TravelExp, LossofEarn, MedInsur, Incent1, Incent2,
ChildCare, and RecovLeave), and “k” is the thirteen control variables (see Table 2).

Our Y or dependent variable is “𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 ". This is the number of organ donations, orgDon,
divided by the population to determine organ donations per capita. We then took the natural log
of these new values to give us 𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 . By taking the natural log of these new values, we ensure
that the data is more normally distributed. This transformation of potentially curved data into a
linear form allows us to run our linear regression tests.
The model is then rounded out with two error terms comprised of the effects of
unobserved variables, where “ai” are any of the unobserved factors (such as culture and health)
that tend to stay constant over time (t) in a country, but vary across the different countries (i).
These unobserved factors are different from the control variables; factors, such as culture, are
very hard to quantify. Finally, "𝜇𝑖𝑡 ” are the unobservable factors that vary with time and country
(such as politics and advertisements) that potentially influence organ donation rates.
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3.2.2 Fixed-Effects and Random Effects Estimators
In fixed panel data the same individuals or in this case countries are observed over
several points of time, i.e., years. Fixed effects estimator is used to eliminate ai in the model.
When these factors are not eliminated, the model could contain biases as they could be correlated
with organ donation and policies.
Random effects allow for variation across countries and time to estimate the coefficients.
Random effects will produce biased estimates if the unobserved variables that do not change
over time (culture) are correlated with the policy variables.
Both sets of results from each estimator are presented for comparison in Tables 5-12, but
in the results section 3.3 we discuss only the fixed effects model.

3.2.3 Regression Analysis
Fourteen individual linear regression tests were conducted3738, one fixed effect and one
random effect for each of the seven treatment variables. Policies were estimated separately to
avoid possible collinearity caused by running all seven treatment variables together and to save
on degrees of freedom in the relatively small sample. Table 13 shows the correlation coefficients
between the policies. LossofEarn has a strong positive correlation (correlation coefficient above
0.5) with TravelExp, MedInsur, and ChildCare. TravelExp also has a strong positive correlation
with MedInsur and ChildCare. Incent2 shows a strong correlation with MedInsur and

37

We initially conducted a fixed effects regression test with all seven treatment variables included. This test resulted
in LossofEarn, RecovLeave, and Incent1 all being significant. However, the standard error for these terms was
extremely large, 218.98, 259.92, and 331.85 respectively. Additionally, Incent2 was omitted. This model only
described 4.98% of the variability. Based on all these factors, the individual tests are better suited to investigate
organ donations per capita.
38
We also ran the model with a comprehensive “policy” binary variable (1= if any of the 7 policies is enacted, 0 =
no policy at all) and found that while the policy variable was positive here, it was not significant.
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RecovLeave. The collinearity between treatment variables justifies estimating models separately
with single policy variables.
Each test included39 all the control variables listed previously, the one policy variable that
was focused on, and three interactive terms. Across all tests we interreacted the same three
control variables with the treatment variable in question: gini, namely the Gini coefficient,
measures the distribution of income in a country and signifying the inequality present in a given
country “i”; beds is the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people; unemp is the unemployment
rate or number of jobless people actively seeking jobs. These interactive terms provide insight
into the relation between the two variables and measure how the effect of policy can vary across
the interactive term. By adding interactive terms, we can interpret the policies impact on organ
donations with specific control variables. For example, comparing a country with the minimum
recorded Gini coefficient versus a country with the maximum recorded Gini value allows us to
see the effect a policy has on donation rates when focusing on inequality.
Each estimated coefficient is tested with the following hypothesis:
𝐻0 : 𝐵𝑗 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2. . ,7
𝐻𝑎 : 𝐵𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,7
We are also testing which control variables are significant to our model with the following
hypothesis:
𝐻0 : 𝜃𝑘 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1,2. . ,13
𝐻𝑎 : 𝜃𝑘 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,13

39

We reran the models and included a linear time trend variable, year. We hoped this time trend would help control
for unobserved characteristics that affect living donations over time (medical tech advances perhaps). However, we
found that adding the time trend changed results only minutely and was never significant.
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3.3 Results
Below, we summarize the results from just the fixed effects estimator model. See Tables
5 through 12 to see results from both random and fixed effects linear regression tests. We also
include only the control variables, treatment variables, and interactive terms that are significant
at the 10% level (where zero is out of the confidence interval with 90% confidence). We note,
political systems vary widely across nations making out-of-sample forecasting possible but not
inherent to the model. We also note that these results are based off of 112 observations.

3.3.1 Travel Expenses
Table 5 provides the regression results for the TravelExp variable. In both fixed effects
(fe) and random effects (re) this policy variable is significant. TravelExp is significant at the 99%
level as the P-value is 0.001, therefore rejecting the null hypothesis. Other significant variables
are giniTravel, bedTravel, beds, juds (percent of population practicing Judaism), chris (percent of
Christians in a population) (all at the 99% level). Unemp and freedom are significant at the 95%
level and internUser is significant at the 90% level.
The fixed effects model for this policy is:
̂𝑖𝑡 = −16.78 + 4.183𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.068𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 − 0.4208𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔
+ 0.0458𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 0.0063𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0122𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 − 0.2391𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
− 0.306𝑗𝑢𝑑 + 0.225𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0652 meaning it explains 6.52% of the variability of the per
capita organ donations. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country, “i”, is 0.8795,
indicating that within each country this model explains 87.95% of the variability.
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The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to
conclude—for a country with a mean Gini coefficient and mean number of hospital beds per
thousand—that organ donations increase by 7.95%40 when travel expenses are reimbursed. The
coefficient on TravelExp carries the greatest value compared with giniTravel and bedsTravel as
it is a significantly larger number. Looking at the interactive term bedsTravel, the more hospital
beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to have travel costs reimbursed has a negative
correlation with the number of organ donations. A possible explanation is that in countries with
more hospital beds, citizens do not have to travel as far to see doctors and have the organ
transplant surgery.
As the Gini value of a country increases, the slope of the supply graph moving out,
resulting in the organ shortage continuing. When interpreting the giniTravel term in context, it
also has a negative effect on the number of organ donations, while this interactive term is not as
large as when TravelExp is interacted with beds, it is still significant. The greater the inequality
(gini) in a country, the ability to have travel costs reimbursed has a negative effect on the number
of organ donations. One hypothesis is that this relationship occurs because countries with high
inequality do not have as good travel provisions (i.e., public transport), which prevents donors
from traveling and incurring related costs.
The control variables are also important to examine when considering why the number
of organ donations rise and fall. Unemp, internUsers, freedom, and chris all have a positive
effect on organ donations. The percentage of Christians in a country has the largest positive
coefficient value associated with it, 0.225. Holding all other variables constant, on average,
organ donations increase by 22.5% with each percent increase of Christians in a population.
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Calculated with all interactive terms, including insignificant terms.
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Perhaps organ donation is strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as an act of generosity
and love. Pope John Paul II stated that, “The Catholic Church would promote the fact that there
is a need for organ donors and that Christians should accept this as a ‘challenge to their
generosity and fraternal love’ so long as ethical principles are followed.”41 Beds and jud have a
negative relation with the number of organ donations. Unlike in Christianity, Judaism does not
encourage living organ donations as the body should be intact for burial. In Jewish law, no organ
may be removed from a donor until after that donor’s death. Because Judaism insists that honor
and respect are due to the dead,42 an increase of one percentage point in the Jewish fraction of
the population decreases organ donations by 30.6%.

3.3.2 Loss of Earnings
Table 6 is our regression results for our LossofEarn variable. This variable is only
significant in the fixed effects (fe) tests. LossofEarn is significant at the 99% level as the P-value
is 0.001. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis. Other variables that are significant at the 99%
level are the two interactive terms giniEarn and bedEarn, as well as lifeExp, beds, jud, and chris.
Unemp and freedom are significant at the 95% level and interUser is significant at the 90% level.
Our fixed effects model for this policy is:
̂𝑖𝑡 = −22.77 + 4.02𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 − 0.064𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 − 0.474𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 0.0409𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔
+ 0.0057𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0121𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 0.2057𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − .246𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
− 0.312𝑗𝑢𝑑 + 0.254𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠
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It has an overall R2 value of 0.0657 meaning it explains 6.57% of the variability of the
data. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country n is 0.8821. Within each country,
this model explains 88.21% of the changes to organ donation over time.
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to
conclude that, for a country with a mean Gini coefficient and mean number of hospital beds per
thousand, organ donations increase by 7.37%43 when loss of income is reimbursed. Looking at
the interactive term bedsEarn, the more hospital beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to
have loss of income reimbursed has a negative effect on the number of organ donations.
Additionally, as the Gini value of a country increases, the slope of the supply graph moving out,
resulting in the organ shortage continuing
When interpreting the giniEarnl term in context, it also has a negative effect on the
number of organ donations, while this interactive term is not as large as when LossodEarn is
interacted with beds, it is still significant. The greater the inequality (gini) in a country, the
smaller the effect of income reimbursement on the number of organ donations. One hypothesis is
that this relationship occurs because in countries experiencing greater inequality citizens are not
making significant enough income to be worried about reimbursement. However, it is also true
that we would expect the opposite relationship: the lower a person’s income, the more important
money is for that person. The expectation is that a person with a low income will care more
about income reimbursement. Our results did not indicate that this is the case. Based on the trend
witnessed in this study, it is not safe to assume that people on a lower income will be motivated
by income reimbursement.
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Calculated with all interactive terms, including insignificant terms.
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The control variables are also important to examine when considering why organ
donations rise and fall. Unemp, internUsers, freedom, lifeExp and chris all have a positive effect
on organ donations. The percentage of Christians in a country and expected life expectancy have
the largest positive coefficient value associated with them, 0.254 and 0.2057, respectively.
Holding all other variables constant, on average organ donations increase by 25.4% with each
percentage increase of Christians in a population. This finding is unsurprising if one considers
that organ donation is encouraged in the Christian religion, or at least not prohibited (see above).
Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers in the context of this
model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations also increases by 20.57%.
Perhaps this is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure
would increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall.
Similar to the TravelExp model, Beds and jud have a negative relation with the number
of organ donations. However, in relation to reimbursement of loss income they have greater
impact on organ donations than in the previous model. Unlike in Christianity, Judaism does not
encourage living organ donations (see discussion above). Thus, the percentage of people
practicing Judaism in a population decreases organ donations by 31.2%. On average, organ
donation rates decrease by 24.6% when the number of hospital beds per thousand increase. If the
number of hospital beds correlates with the quality of the healthcare system in a country, then the
greater the number of hospital beds, the better the healthcare system, and less need for organs
(given not as much kidney failure).

3.3.3 Recovery Leave
Table 7 provides regression results for the RecovLeave variable. This variable is only
significant in the fixed effects (fe) test. RecovLeave is significant at the 99% level as the P-value
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is 0.000. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. Other variables that are significant at the 99%
level are the interactive terms bedsLeave, unemp, internUsers, and beds. Freedom is also
significant at the 90% level.
Our fixed effects model for this policy is:
̂𝑖𝑡 = −5.05 + 5.4227𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 − 0.9546𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 + 0.011𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔
− 0.241𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 0.0089𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0606 meaning it explains 6.06% of the variability of the
data. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country n is 0.8923, meaning within each
country this model explains 89.23% of the change of organ donation over time.
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to say,
for a country with the mean number of hospital beds per thousand, organ donations increase by
26.24%44 when a period of paid recovery is offered post-surgery. Looking at the interactive term
bedsLeave, the more hospital beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to have a period off
work to recover has a negative effect on the number of organ donations. It is possible to
hypothesize that maybe places with more hospital beds have better surgeons and therefore do not
need as much time off to recover from surgery.
The control variables internUsers and freedom have a positive relationship with organ
donation rates. On average, as the percent of the population that uses the internet increases, organ
donations increase by 1.1%. We hypothesis this positive relationship is because people who use
the internet have ready access to information and could be more aware of the implementation of
policies and more up to date on the possibility of living donation. Additionally, holding other
variables constant, as the percentage of people who perceived noncorrupting increased, organ
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donation rates increase by 0.89%, on average. We can hypothesize that this positive relationship
is because that in countries that are freer from corruption there may be more confidence that the
donation will be as the donor directs compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and
transplant tourism take place.
Beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ donations in this
model looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. This consistent
negative relationship between beds and organ donation rates can be hypothesized that if the
number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the country, then the greater the number of
beds the better the system and less need for organs because there is not as much kidney failure.

3.3.4 Medical Insurance
Table 8 provides regression results for the MedInsur variable. This variable is not
significant in either the fixed effect estimator or the random effects with a p-value of 0.968 and
0.011, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both instances. Offering
medical insurance does not have significant effect on the percent of organ donations.
In the fixed effects estimator model the interactive term unempMed is significant at the
99% level as well as freedom, lifeExp, and beds. InterUser and chris are significant at the 95%
level.
The fixed effects model for this policy is:
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 = −15.75 − 0.1458𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝑒𝑑 + 0.0082𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.014𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚
+ 0.19𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.4024𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 0.1296𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0666 meaning it explains 6.66% of the variability of the
data.
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The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variable unempMed indicates
that for a country with the mean unemployment rate of 6.23%, organ donations increase by
4.65%45 when medical insurance is offered for a period ranging from five years to a lifetime after
donation. This positive relationship is what we would expect from an incentive being offered.
The greater the unemployment rate in a country, the smaller the effect of medical coverage on
the number of kidney donations. It is possible to hypothesize this relationship exists because of
our small sample of countries. Only three of our countries (Singapore, Israel, and Saudi Arabia)
offer the medical insurance policy in a given year and none of these countries has a very high
unemployment rate. The slope of the supply line becomes steeper and more inelastic the more
unemployed people there are in a country.
The control variables internUsers, freedom, lifeExp, and chris have a positive
relationship with organ donation rates. On average, as the percent of the population that uses the
internet increases, organ donations increase by 0.82%. We hypothesis this positive relationship is
because people who use the internet have ready access to information and could be more aware
of the implementation of policies and more up to date on the possibility of living donation.
Additionally, holding other variables constant, as the percentage of people who perceived
noncorrupting increased, organ donation rates increase by 1.4%, on average. We can hypothesize
that this positive relationship is because that in countries that are freer from corruption there may
be more confidence that the donation will be as the donor directs compared with corrupt
countries where organ bazars and transplant tourism take place. The percent of Christians in a
country and expected life expectancy have the largest positive coefficient value associated with
them, 0.129 and 0.19, respectively. Holding all other variables constant, on average, organ
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donations increase by 12.9% with each percent increase of Christians in a population. This is to
be expected as organ donation is strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as it is seen as an
act of donation and love.46 Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers
in this model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations increases by 19%.
This is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would
increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall.
In this model beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ
donations when looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. Holding all
other variables constant, on average, organ donations decrease by 40.24% with an increase in the
number of hospital beds. This consistent negative relationship between beds and organ donation
rates can be hypothesized that if the number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the
country, then the greater the number of beds the better the system and less need for organs
because there is not as much kidney failure.

3.3.5 Incentive Bundle 2
Table 9 shows the regression results for the Incent2 variable. This variable is only
significant in the fixed effects (fe) tests. Incent2 is significant at the 90% level with a t-value of
1.68. Therefore, we reject our null hypothesis. The two interactive terms bedCent2 and
unempCent2 are significant at the 95% level. Other significant variables are interUser and beds
at the 99% level and freedom, lifeExp, and jud at the 90% significance level.
The fixed effects model for this policy is:
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̂𝑖𝑡 = −11.748 + 7.41166𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡2 − 3.0104𝑏𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡2 − 0.1542𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡2
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔
+ 0.0085𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0099𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 0.1277𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.406𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
+ 0.2681𝑗𝑢𝑑
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0011 meaning it explains 0.11% of the variability of the
data. This is our lowest R2 value recorded.
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variable allows us to say that
for a country with the mean number of beds per thousand (3.03) and the mean unemployment
rate (6.23%), organ donations increase by 86.94%47 when the policies included in this treatment
variable are offered. Looking at the interactive term bedsCent2, the more hospital beds for 1,000
people in a country, the policies unique to Israel (pay for up to five psychological treatments
undertaken up to 48 months after the donation; provide loss of work insurance for five years;
provide life insurance for up to five years. Also have a three-tier point based priority system (see
1.4.4)) have a negative effect on the number of organ donations. When interpreting the
unempCent2 term in context, it also has a negative effect on the number of organ donations.
While this interactive term is not as large as when Incent2 is interacted with beds, it is still
significant. The greater the unemployment rate in a country, the ability to have the policies
bundled into this treatment variable has a smaller effect on the number of organ donations.
The control variables are also important when considering why organ donations rise
and fall. InternUsers, freedom, lifeExp and jud all have a positive effect on organ donations. On
average, as the percent of the population that uses the internet increases, organ donations
increase by 0.85%. We hypothesis this positive relationship because people who use the internet
are going to be more aware of the implantation of policies and more up to date on the possibility
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of living donation as they have more information available to them at their fingertips.
Additionally, holding other variables constant, as a person perceived freedom from corruption
increased, organ donation rates increase by 0.99%, on average. We can hypothesis that this
positive relationship because it is likely more legal organ donations take place in countries that
are freer from corruption compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and transplant
tourism would take place. Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers
in this model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations increases by 19%.
This is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would
increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall.
It is unusual that the percent of the population practicing Judaism has a positive effect on
the number of organ donations because living donation is not encouraged in this religion. This
abnormality could be because Israel was the only country looked at in this model and the
population of Jewish people could have just coincidently happened to increase as organ
donations increased.
Beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ donations in this
model looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. Holding all other
variables constant, on average, organ donations decrease by 40.6% with an increase in the
number of hospital beds. This consistent negative relationship between beds and organ donation
rates can be hypothesized that if the number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the
country, then the greater the number of beds the better the system and less need for organs
because there is not as much kidney failure.

3.3.6 Incentive Bundle 1
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Tables 10 and 11 summarize the regression results for the Incent1 variable. When
running a regression test on this variable as was done for all the others, the variable was omitted
due to collinearity. Therefore, it was not included in the results (see Table 10). However, as this
is the main variable of interest, the test was retained removing all other variables to see which
was causing the error and discovered it was the interaction between the terms gini and incent1.
This variable was removed from the regression and is discussed below.
This variable is not significant in neither fixed effect estimator nor random effects with a
p-value of 0.167 and 0.635, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both
instances. Offering travel discounts, a medal of honor, and a direct monetary reward does not
have a significant effect on the percent of organ donations. Additionally, the remaining two
interactive terms have no significant effect on living organ donations rates.

3.3.7 Childcare
Table 12 provides the regression results for the ChildCare treatment variable. This policy
variable is not significant in either fixed effects estimator or random effects with a p-value of
0.559 and 0.005, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both instances.
Offering reimbursement of child care costs does not have significant effect on the percent of
organ donations. The interactive term unempChild is significant at the 99% level as well as the
control variables freedom, lifeExp, and beds. Mus is significant at the 95% level and chris is
significant at the 90% level.
The fixed effects model for this policy is:
̂𝑖𝑡 = −25.00 + 0.0098𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 0.016𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 0.343𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.409𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔
− 0.1721𝑚𝑢𝑠 + 0.1440𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠
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It has an overall R2 value of 0.0696 meaning it explains 6.96% of the variability of the
data.
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to say,
for a country with a mean unemployment rate of 6.23%, organ donations increase by 61.24%48
when childcare expenses are reimbursed. The interactive term unempChild is the only interactive
term in any of our seven models that has a positive relationship with organ donations. The
greater the unemployment rate in a country, the offer to reimburse childcare expenses has a more
positive effect on the number of organ donations. This suggests that countries with high
unemployment numbers are influenced by the financial costs of childcare coverage. It is possible
to hypothesize this relationship exists because a country with a high unemployment values the
ability to place children in organizational care, thus allowing job seekers to seek work
undistracted. Therefore, the slope of the supply line becomes more horizontal and elastic the
more unemployed people there are in a country.
The control variables freedom, lifeExp, and chris have a positive relationship with organ
donation rates. Holding other variables constant, as a person perceived freedom from corruption
increased, organ donation rates increase by 1.6%, on average. We can hypothesis that this
positive relationship because it is likely more legal organ donations take place in countries that
are freer from corruption compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and transplant
tourism would take place. The percent of Christians in a country and expected life expectancy
have the largest positive coefficient value associated with them, 0.144 and 0.343, respectively.
Holding all other variables constant, on average organ donations increase by 14.4% with each
percent increase of Christians in a population. This is to be expected as organ donation is
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strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as it is seen as an act of donation and love.49 Life
expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers in this model. As life
expectancy increase, the percent of organ donations increase by 34.3%. This is because the
ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would increase life expectancy
of the person and the country overall.
Beds and mus have a negative impact on organ donations in this model looking at the
effects of childcare reimbursement. Holding all other variables constant, on average organ
donations decrease by 40.24% with an increase in the number of hospital beds. This consistent
negative relationship between beds and organ donation rates can be hypothesized that the
number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the country, the greater the beds the better
the system and the less of a need for organs because there isn’t as much kidney failure.
Muslims believe that God greatly rewards those who save others from death, so we
would not expect the percent of the population practicing Islam to have a negative relationship
with organ donation rates. Violating the human body, whether living or dead, is normally
forbidden in Islam. The Shariah, however, waives this prohibition in a number of instances:
firstly, in cases of necessity; and secondly in saving another person’s life.50 However, in this
model an increase of one percentage point in the Muslin fraction of the population decreases
organ donations by 17.21%. It is possible to hypothesis that this anomaly occurred because
Muslims, just like Jews, are picky about burial rites and it’s just not a tradition to donate organs.
It doesn’t occur to them.
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion
4.1 Review of Objectives and Results
This study sought to investigate the effects of government incentive policies on the
number of living kidney donors, then specifically evaluate the significance of different policies.
The importance of living organ donations and addressing the current shortages globally was
outlined. We discussed the unethical practices that these shortages are causing, thus prompting
the creation of the Declaration of Istanbul and international standards for organ donation
guidelines and ethics. The research goal was to test whether the reimbursement packages offered
in Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States
would increase living kidney organ donations. After selecting the seven countries because of
their comprehensive incentive policies, organ donor data was collected from many sources and
compiled it into one data set which was used as the basis for the research. A number of control
variables were selected from TheGlobalEconomy.com for inclusion in our model. This allowed
us to directly control for outside factors that could be correlated with policy implementation,
current events that happened in various years, and organ donor numbers. After reading numerous
other studies on this topic, we theorized that as price increased the supply of organ donors would
increase, thus reducing the organ shortage.

4.2 Discussion
Regression analysis indicates treatment variables TravelExp, LossofEarn, RecovLeave
and Incent2 are all significant in the fixed effects model. In context, this means that
implementing reimbursement of travel expenses and loss of earnings, as well as offering a period

Laverty-Smith 60
of recovery, and the policies unique to Israel increases living kidney organ donations by 7.95%,
7.37%, 26.24%, and 89.94% respectively, when interpreted with the mean Gini coefficient,
number of hospital beds per thousand, and unemployment rate. The remaining three treatment
variables, MedInsur, Incent1, and ChildCare did not significantly affect the number of organ
donations (without the interactive term).
Based on Apte’s study (see section 1.3.2) we hypothesized that a country like the United
States—where there is great economic disparity—would see a dramatic increase in living organ
donors if a generous reimbursement package were offered. If, like Saudi Arabia and Israel, the
United States considered offering long-term health insurance, then our projection is that the
number of living organ donors would rise as the pursuit of healthcare would motivate donors
who do not have adequate health care. This was the case in our analysis, while it was not
significant, it increased organ donations by 4.64% in the countries that implanted this policy
(Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Israel).
Bedcent2 and unempCent2 were significant and when interpreted with the mean number
of hospital beds per thousand and unemployment rate organ donations decrease by 267.05%.
This treatment variable associated with policies implanted by only Israel has the largest effect on
donation rates in our regression tests. This is not in line with Apte’s research where she found
that Israel donor numbers doubled while their incentive package was in effect.
Incent1 had no significant effect on organ donation rates. This was the package unique to
Saudi Arabia and had the lowest occurrence rate in the data. The final treatment variable
ChildCare was also found to be insignificant when not interacted with anything. UnempChild
was significant at the 99% level and was the only interactive term that had a positive effect on
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organ donation numbers. When interpreted with the mean unemployment rate it increased living
kidney donations by 6.11%.
Based on these results the implementation of three out of the seven treatment variables
would positively increase living kidney donations.

4.2.1 Limitations
The regression analysis presented some limitations that we need to acknowledge,
including missing data, omitted variables, small number of countries(n) used, and data “darning”.
Here, we discuss the challenges that these issues presented and how they may have adversely
affected our results. Considering study limitations naturally lends itself to contemplation of
future research directions, which we elaborate on in the next section.
Certain data for the control variables were not available for every year and country in our
data. This weakens the statistical power of the analysis as that whole year is then not included in
the regression. Thus, for our control variables that aren’t recorded every year, we made the
assumption that the change between a year would be marginal and therefore could be recoded as
the previous year’s value. Specifically, the Gini coefficient is not collected and recoded each
year, so we let the few years it was recoded in each country account for all years we needed
(2004 to 2019). However, these are still missing data points and not a completely accurate
representation of the country/year in question.
Additionally, while the fixed effects model does eliminate the bias caused by ai there
could be other omitted variables that we did not control for in our model.
Since the data used in this study is only from seven countries it is not necessarily
representative of the world as a whole. The world has countries that vary greatly in terms of their
health systems, inequality, and government involvement all which are important to take into

Laverty-Smith 62
account when looking at incentive polices and organ donation numbers. If the necessary data
could be collected and obtained for living donations from all countries, it would form a more
accurate representation of the effects of reimbursement packages as well as the current state of
organ donations. Further, as this study was only conducted with data from a 16-year period, the
findings may not be directly representative of the effects of the policies. The incentive policies in
The United States had been in effect for only one year when our data was collected. This isn’t a
very significant amount of time to judge the effectiveness of a policy. On the flip side of that the
United Kingdom’s data doesn’t date past before the policies were put into effect. Thus, we can’t
see the change over time in donation rates from the incentive policy.
Finally, the data on living kidney donations was collected from seven different sources
(one for each country) and combined into the one data set we used. While we tried to be as
consistent as possible to ensure that all data being reported was in fact from a) living donors and
b) donors donating kidneys, there is going to be discrepancies between the different
organizations data reporting. For example, one country might consider the end of the year
December 1st and report their findings for that year ending then, whereas another country might
wait till January 1st of the following year to stop counting donations from that previous year.

4.3 Future Research
Both the challenges and successes of this study suggest many directions for future
research. These include repeating the analysis with a larger sample size; repeating it with
individual level data looking at variables such as income, race, and gender of the donor; and also
looking at how these policies have affected transplant tourism. The few discussed here represent
just the tip of the iceberg for potential future investigations.
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By including all countries where living organ donor data is represented, we would have a
more accurate representation of how these policies affect donor numbers. It would paint a larger
picture of the world’s population’s relationship with incentives when it comes to organ donation.
It would also give us control countries to look at when analyzing our results. We believe this
type of study is a few years off as the seriousness of living organ donation is just starting to be
acknowledged and therefore data is limited. The United States is considered the world’s leading
economic superpower, that being said they only recently (2019) implemented any type of policy
to break down the financial barriers in place preventing organ donation.
We believe it would also be interesting to gain individual level data on organ donors as
well as non organ donors and see how demographic variables effect donor numbers. We could
answer questions like, how does income affect a person’s likelihood to be a living organ donor. It
would also lead to an interesting comparison of race, gender, or age with and organ donation.
Kidney disease disproportionately affects minorities and low-income patients in America.
Compared to whites, African Americans are three and a half times more likely to have kidney
failure, Native Americans are one and half times more likely to have kidney failure, and
Hispanics are one and half times more likely to have kidney failure.51 Would this same disparity
between people suffering from kidney failure be seen in people willing to donate?
This same idea could also be put into a survey and asked globally and looked at from a
more behavioral economic view point. For example, randomly selected individuals would be
asked how likely they were to donate a kidney today. Another group of people would be told
various statistics surrounding organ donation like the one above about minorities being affected
and asked how likely they would be to become a living donor. We could then analyze if

“Statistics · The Kidney Project.” The Kidney Project, The Regents of the University of California, 20 Oct. 2020,
pharm.ucsf.edu/kidney/need/statistics.
51
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minorities, when told that they were the ones most commonly being affected by kidney failure,
would be more willing to donate.
Another area for future research is looking at organ harvesting and illegal organ trading.
Our motivation for looking at living organ donation was sparked by reading Bloody Harvest:
Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China (2009), by David Matas and David
Kilgour, an ethnographic study of the Falun Gong, an ascetic religious group. In 1999, the
Chinese government outlawed the Falun Gong, leading to their arrest, torture, kidnapping, and
imprisonment. In Bloody Harvest, the authors establish that the Chinese government was
harvesting organs from these prisoners resulting in their eventual death. This book was eyeopening for me and lead me to want to explore the topic further. Internationally, China appears to
have one of the shortest organ waitlists. However, based on my reading of Bloody Harvest, I now
know that some Chinese citizens do not donate organs willingly and neither does the Chinese
government put in place maximizing incentive policies.
While the lack of data is what lead us to investigate the incentive policies rather than
looking at the welfare of countries and how this affected illegal organ trafficking, we still believe
this would lead to an interesting study. We could also use what we now know about the role of
incentive policies in the organ shortage problem and make suggestions regarding policies that
countries grappled with unethical organ trading posts could implement.
Another interesting sub-topic of the organ shortage discussion is Iran. Iran is the only
country where selling one’s organ is legal. The study of this country and how this policy has
affected its waitlist times and number of people dying from kidney failure each year could be a
potential area for future research.
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4.4 Conclusion
This thesis examined seven countries (Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
the United Kingdom, and the United Sates) over the past 16 years (2004-2019) to evaluate the
effect of incentive polices on living kidney donation rates. As the focus of this study is the
impact of policy on donation numbers, the primary variables of interest were those that indicated
living kidney donation numbers and other binary variables that represented the policies in effect.
We also controlled for other factors that could have an impact on donation rates such as wealth
indicators, the quality of the health care system, and demographic factors.
We then looked at other studies that have been conducted on this topic that found
incentive policies to have an effect on organ donations. These studies also discussed the ethical
implications of implementing these polices such as financially taking advantage of the poor.
To test the significance of these treatment variables (the policies) we conducted 14
individual fixed effects and random effects regression tests. These were able to tell us that
reimbursement of travel expenses, income, childcare, and providing a period of paid recovery all
significantly increase donation rates. Offering medical insurance and the polices included in
incent1 (unique to Saudi Arabia) relates to decreases in the number of organ donations.
The organ shortage that we as country are facing is growing. By implementing polices we
hope as a nation to shrink this shortage and save the lives of thousands of people who die each
year from kidney failure. Additionally, by increasing the availability of kidneys for transplant
Medicare and health insurance companies will save the billions of dollars spent annually on
dialysis. Not only is kidney transplantation the preferred way to treat kidney failure for patients,
it also makes the most financial sense. This paper has shown that governments can help
encourage more kidney donations most effectively by implanting policies that reimburse travel
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costs associated with donations, reimburse individuals for income lost while undergoing and
recovering from surgery, offer a period of paid recovery, and offer incentive unique to Israel
(including their priority system, life insurance, loss of work insurance, and psychological
treatment coverage).
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Appendix
Table 1. Data Sources and Descriptions
Countries
Australia

Data Collected
By:
ANZDATA

Israel

ADI - National
Transplant
Center.

Ireland

HSE

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Center
for Organ
Transplantation
Live On

Singapore

Description of Organization

Data

An organization funded by the
Australian and New Zealand
governments and Kidney
Health Australia to gather data
on living kidney donors and
their perspectives. It provides
information on the long-term
health of living kidney donors
in Australia and New Zealand
This is a branch of the
Ministry of Health that is
charge of handling organ
donations and transplants.
They are responsible for
everything from collecting
organs and registering the
patients to reimbursing donors
and advocating for the vital
importance of organ donation.
An organization funded by the
government and overseen by
the Minister of Health. The
HSE provides all of Ireland's
public health services in
hospitals and communities
across the country.
The Saudi Center’s mission is
to alleviate suffering through
organ transplants.
An organization run out of
Singapore National Organ
Transplant Unit and the
Ministry of Health. Live On
supports organ donations and
spreads awareness of the
incredible effects of donating
an organ

The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2004

The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2004

The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2004

The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2004
The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2010
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United Kingdom

Transplant
Organ
Donation and
Transplantation
Group

United States

The Scientific
Registry of
Transplant
Recipients
(SRTR)

This group is a part of the
NHS. Along with collecting
data, this collaborative body is
responsible for managing the
donation, storage, and
transplantation of blood,
organs, tissues, bone marrow,
and stem cells, and researching
new treatments and processes.
The SRTR is managed by the
Division of Transplantation
and the United States
Department of Health and
Human Services. This
database has information about
every transplant and organ
donation from October 1987
until today in the United
States.

Table 2. Description of Control Variable
Name
Control Variable
gdp

GDP per capita

unemp

Unemployment Rate

lawInd

Rule of Law Index

interUser

Internet users

The number of living
kidney donations per year,
going back to 2004

Individual Level:
citizenship, age, education
level, ethnicity, gender,
geographic location by
state, race, insurance, and
income level (10,000 units)
Panel Data: The number of
kidney donations by living
donors per year, going back
to 2004

Definition as defined by
TheGlobalEconomy.com
Gross Domestic Product, in
billions per capita
The share of the labor force that
is without work but seeking
employment.
Captures the perceptions of the
extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the
rules of society; likelihood of
crime and violence. Ranges
from -2.5 to 2.5, where the
higher the value, the more
confidence agents have in
society.
Individuals who have used the
internet in the last 3 months, as
a percent of the population.
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freedom

Freedom from corruption index

healthSpend

Health spending per capita

lifeExp

Life expectancy

beds
gini

Hospital beds
Gini income inequality index

jud
mus
chris

People practicing Judaism
Muslims
Christians

Derived from Transparency
International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index.
Current expenditures on health
per capita in current US dollars.
The number of years a newborn
infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the time
of its birth were to stay the
same throughout its life.
Per 1,000 residents
Measures the extent to which
the distribution of income
among individuals deviates
from a perfectly equal
distribution.
Percent of Population
Percent of Population
Percent of Population

Table 3. Description of Treatment Variable and Occurrence Rate in Data
Name
Policy Variable
TravelExp
Donors are reimbursed costs associated with
travel expenses and accommodation
LossofEarn
Compensation for living donors' lost income
for varying weeks post-op (country
dependent)
MedInsur
Donors are provided with medical care
regulated at a national level. Coverage
varying from 5 years up to a lifetime.
Incent1
Unique to Saudi Arabia: Donors are awarded
the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the third
degree and provided with a discount card
giving the donor 50% off all Saudi Arabian
Airlines tickets for a lifetime. Also given a
one-time payment of $13,000
Incent2
Unique to Israel: Refund up to 5
psychological treatments undertaken up to 48
months after the donation; provide loss of
work insurance for 5 years; provide life
insurance for up to 5 years. Also have a
three-tier point based priority system (see
1.4.4).

Occurrence
73 (65.18%)
66 (58.93%)

36 (32.14%)

13 (11.61%)

12 (10.71 %)
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ChildCare
RecovLeave

Reimbursement of childcare expenses.
A period for recovery ranging from a paid 7day vacation to a period of paid-time off.

Table 4. Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Variable
Mean
Std. Deviation
GDP (PerGDP)
3.71
0.41
Unemployment Rate 6.23
2.55
(unemp)
Rule of Law
1.36
0.58
(lawInd)
Internet Users
70.89
18.29
(interUser)
Freedom from
73.03
15.75
corruption (freedom)
Population Size
63.47
103.79
(pop)
Health Spending
3,910.92
2,461.36
(healthSpen)
Life Expectancy
79.82
2.73
(lifeExp)
Hospital Beds (beds) 3.03
0.72
Gini coefficient
39.22
5.29
(gini)
People practicing
11.38
26.97
Judaism (jud)
Muslims (mus)
19.63
32.15
Christians (chris)
44.87
35.71

39 (34.82%)
25 (22.32%)

Minimum
2.41
3.68

Maximum
4.37
15.45

-0.01

1.92

10.23

95.72

33

95

4.07

328.24

400.88

10,623.85

73.16

83.15

2.41
30.9

5.64
45.9

0

79.10

0
2.2

97
95.6
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Table 5. Regression Results for TravelExp Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
TravelExp

2.6493*

1.95

0.051

4.1834*** 3.57

0.001

giniTravel

-.0646***

-2.73

0.006

-.0683***

-3.52

0.001

bedTravel

.15859

1.11

0.266

-.4208***

-3.01

0.003

unempTravel

-.0521

-1.48

0.140

-.0241

-1.15

0.254

unemp

-.0442

-1.99

0.046

.0458**

2.62

0.011

lawInd

.9798**

2.48

0.013

-.1191

-0.45

0.655

interUser

.0226***

5.92

0.000

.0063*

1.90

0.062

freedom

.0152**

2.17

0.030

.0122**

2.37

0.020

healthSpend

.0001**

2.32

0.021

5.35e-06

0.11

0.913

lifeExp

-.0992

-2.18

0.030

.1749

2.36

0.021

beds

-.4017***

-3.78

0.000

-.2391***

-3.23

0.002

gini

.0754***

2.76

0.006

.0202

0.62

0.537

jud

.0256***

4.46

0.000

-.3062***

-3.44

0.001

mus

.0192**

2.35

0.019

-.1314

-1.70

0.093

chris

.01629***

3.26

0.001

.2254***

3.42

0.001

perGDP

-1.568***

-5.56

0.000

-.1441

-0.60

0.547

_cons

8.6141***

2.65

0.008

-16.7810

-2.25

0.027

Control Variables
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R2

O=0.8253

W=0.6412 B=0.9847

O=0.0652

W=0.8795 B=0.1122

Table 6. Regression Results for LossofEarn Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
lossOfEarn

-.1334

-0.10

0.923

4.01986*** 3.50

0.001

giniEarn

-.02145

-0.88

0.378

-.0645***

-3.39

0.001

bedEarn

.2275

1.44

0.149

-.4739***

-3.57

0.001

unempEarn

.0291

0.79

0.427

-.0104

-0.51

0.609

Control Variables
unemp

-.0911***

-4.17

0.000

.0409**

2.39

0.019

lawInd

.5409

1.21

0.226

-.2213

-0.86

0.393

interUser

.0223***

5.19

0.000

.0057*

1.71

0.091

freedom

.0233***

3.01

0.003

.0121**

2.38

0.020

healthSpend

.0001***

2.99

0.003

.00001

0.29

0.773

lifeExp

-.0277

-0.58

0.562

.2057***

2.64

0.010

beds

-.4874***

-4.21

0.000

-.2463***

- 3.41

0.001

gini

.01230

0.45

0.650

.0254

0.80

0.424

jud

.02061***

3.09

0.002

-.3122***

-3.59

0.001

mus

.0201**

2.09

0.037

-.1243

-1.62

0.109

chris

.0098*

1.64

0.100

.2544***

3.83

0.000
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perGDP

-1.5852***

-4.95

0.000

-.0939

-0.41

0.682

_cons

6.4967*

1.80

0.072

-20.772***

-2.62

0.010

R2

O= 0.7838

W= 0.5877

B= 0.9676

O= 0.0657

W=0.8812 B= 0.1109

Table 7. Regression Results for RecovLeave Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
RecovLeave

3.6212**

2.26

0.024

5.4227***

4.85

0.000

giniLeave

-.0369

-1.19

0.233

-.0434

-1.86

0.067

bedLeave

-.3499

-1.03

0.303

-.9546***

-3.39

0.001

unempLeave

-.1104

-2.30

0.022

-.0908

-2.39

0.019

Control Variables
unemp

-.0473

-1.84

0.066

.0452***

2.89

0.005

lawInd

.6862

1.64

0.101

.0489

0.19

0.849

interUser

.0221***

5.95

0.000

.0110***

3.52

0.001

freedom

.0258***

3.52

0.000

.0089*

1.84

0.069

healthSpend

.0002***

4.59

0.000

-.0001

-2.01

0.048

lifeExp

-.0688

-1.22

0.223

.1026

1.22

0.228

beds

-.3053

-2.35

0.019

-.2611***

-4.04

0.000

gini

.0059

0.34

0.730

.0228

0.82

0.417

jud

.0141*

1.81

0.070

-.1441

-1.31

0.194
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mus

.0135*

1.62

0.106

-.1011

-1.39

0.168

chris

.0032

0.58

0.561

.0387

0.63

0.532

perGDP

-2.1253***

-6.98

0.000

-.0814

-0.40

0.693

_cons

10.8958*** 2.71

0.007

-5.0492

-0.60

0.548

R2

O=0.7932

B= 0.9582

O= 0.0606 W=0.8923

W= 0.6209

B= 0.1417

Table 8. Regression Results for MedIns Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
medInsur

11.0548**

2.53

0.011

-.1026

-0.04

0.968

giniMed

-.2067

-2.54

0.011

.0032

0.07

0.948

bedMed

-.9966

-1.95

0.051

.3087

1.07

0.286

unempMed

.0595

0.75

0.452

-.1458***

-2.87

0.005

Control Variables
unemp

-.0618***

-2.66

0.008

.0145

1.05

0.297

lawInd

.1434

0.32

0.749

-.1303

-0.50

0.621

interUser

.0240***

5.67

0.000

.0082**

2.50

0.015

freedom

.0223***

3.05

0.002

.0140***

2.71

0.008

healthSpend

.0001**

2.33

0.020

-.0001

-2.01

0.047

lifeExp

.0072

0.15

0.880

.1900***

2.65

0.010

beds

-.3651***

-3.65

0.000

-.4024***

-6.66

0.000
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gini

.0359

1.48

0.138

-.0222

-0.77

0.444

jud

.0123*

1.62

0.105

-.04203

-0.37

0.713

mus

.0104

1.13

0.259

-.0822

-1.04

0.300

chris

.0078

1.57

0.116

.1296**

2.18

0.032

perGDP

-1.6866***

-5.05

0.000

.0224

0.09

0.926

_cons

3.5223

1.06

0.287

-15.7515

-2.19

0.032

R2

O=0.7883

W= 0.6047

B= 0.9643

O= 0.0666 W=0.8760

B= 0.1251

Table 9. Regression Results for Incent2 Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
incent2

2.2041

0.31

0.756

7.4166*

1.68

0.097

giniCent2

.0459

0.38

0.704

.0901

1.31

0.193

bedCent2

-.9298

-0.46

0.647

-3.0104**

-2.19

0.031

unempCent2

-.1549

-1.17

0.241

-.1542**

-2.20

0.030

Control Variables
unemp

-.0564**

-2.36

0.018

.01903

1.41

0.162

lawInd

-.1183

-0.26

0.793

-.0789

-0.31

0.754

interUser

.0218***

5.84

0.000

.0085***

3.00

0.004

freedom

.0248***

3.37

0.001

.0099*

1.95

0.055

healthSpend

.0002***

4.98

0.000

-.0001

-1.50

0.137
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lifeExp

.0183

0.39

0.693

.1277*

1.79

0.078

beds

-.3372***

-3.36

0.001

-.4064***

-6.94

0.000

gini

.0044

0.26

0.795

-.0280

-0.98

0.328

jud

.0096

1.21

0.227

.2681*

1.62

0.109

mus

.0072

0.78

0.438

-.1203

-1.55

0.126

chris

.0063

1.23

0.218

.0938

1.59

0.115

perGDP

-2.0118***

-7.41

0.000

-.0126

-0.06

0.953

_cons

5.0541

1.57

0.115

-11.7482

-1.67

0.099

R2

O=0.7840

W= 0.6151

B= 0.9539

O= 0.0011 W=0.8850

B= 0.0021

Table 10. Regression Results for Incent1 Variable
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
Incent1

(omitted)

(omitted)

(omitted)

(omitted)

(omitted)

(omitted)

giniCent1

.0361

0.48

0.635

-.0595

-1.39

0.167

bedCent1

-.0413

-0.05

0.957

.5457

1.29

0.199

unempCent1

-.2035

-0.40

0.686

.2707

0.98

0.328

Control Variables
unemp

-.0887***

-4.15

0.000

.0045

0.30

0.763

lawInd

.3039

0.74

0.458

.0297

0.11

0.915

interUser

.0179***

3.29

0.001

.0019

0.53

0.598
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freedom

.0261***

3.47

0.001

.0131**

2.36

0.021

healthSpend

.0002***

5.27

0.000

-.0001

-1.48

0.142

lifeExp

.0276

0.55

0.581

.2471***

3.35

0.001

beds

-.4526***

-4.30

0.000

-.4432***

-6.22

0.000

gini

-.0104

-0.61

0.543

-.0497

-1.88

0.064

jud

.0182***

3.05

0.002

-.1435

-1.62

0.109

mus

.0137

1.56

0.118

-.1301

-1.60

0.113

chris

.0084*

1.71

0.088

.1428**

2.33

0.022

perGDP

-1.9865***

-7.18

0.000

.1109

0.44

0.663

_cons

4.5268

1.36

0.174

-17.5870

-2.33

0.022

R2

O=0.7748

W= 0.5710

B= 0.9691

O= 0.0705 W=0.8614

B= 0.1286

Table 11. Regression Results for Incent1 Variable (excluding Gini interactive term)
Random-Effects
Variables

Coef

Fixed-Effects

z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
Incent1

1.6562

0.48

0.635

-2.7295

-1.39

0.167

bedCent1

-.0413

-0.05

0.957

.5457

1.29

0.199

unempCent1

-.2035

-0.40

0.686

.2707

0.98

0.328

Control Variables
unemp

-.0887***

-4.15

0.000

.0045

0.30

0.763

lawInd

.3039

0.74

0.458

.0297

0.11

0.915
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interUser

.0179***

3.29

0.001

.0019

0.53

0.598

freedom

.0261***

3.47

0.001

.0131**

2.36

0.021

healthSpend

.0002***

5.27

0.000

-.0001

-1.48

0.142

lifeExp

.0276

0.55

0.581

.2472***

3.35

0.001

beds

-.4526***

-4.30

0.000

-.4432***

-6.22

0.000

gini

-.0104

-0.61

0.543

-.0497

-1.88

0.064

jud

.0182***

3.05

0.002

-.1435

-1.62

0.109

mus

.0137

1.56

0.118

-.1301

-1.60

0.113

chris

.0084*

1.71

0.088

.1428**

2.33

0.022

perGDP

-1.9865***

-7.18

0.000

.1109

0.44

0.663

_cons

4.5268

1.36

0.174

-17.587**

-2.33

0.022

R2

O=0.7748

W= 0.5710

B= 0.9691

O= 0.0705 W=0.8614

B= 0.1286

Table 12. Regression Results for ChildCare Variable
Random-Effects
Variable

Coef

Fixed-Effects
z-value

P

Coef

t-value

P

Treatment Variables
ChildCare

3.9230***

2.83

0.005

-1.3440

-0.59

0.559

giniChild

-.2284***

-6.60

0.000

.0150

0.22

0.825

bedChild

.8197***

6.87

0.000

.0249

0.10

0.920

unempChild

.1210***

3.72

0.000

.0985***

2.83

0.006

Control Variables
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unemp

-.0714***

-4.85

0.000

-.0108

-0.53

0.599

lawInd

.2295

0.68

0.497

-.2386

-0.86

0.393

interUser

.0120***

4.52

0.000

.0015

0.54

0.588

freedom

.0155***

2.99

0.003

.0162***

3.24

0.002

healthSpend

-.0001

-1.75

0.080

-.0001

-1.19

0.239

lifeExp

.1178***

3.37

0.001

.3430***

4.18

0.000

beds

-.6226***

-8.18

0.000

-.4092***

-5.19

0.000

gini

.1310***

5.56

0.000

-.0136

-0.45

0.652

jud

-.0183***

-2.93

0.003

-.1528

-1.58

0.118

mus

-.0206***

-2.57

0.010

-.1721**

-2.31

0.024

chris

-.0149***

-3.24

0.001

.1440*

1.88

0.064

perGDP

-.5134**

-2.23

0.026

-.0328

-0.15

0.880

_cons

-7.9610***

-2.56

0.010

-24.99***

-2.95

0.004

R2

O=0.8983

W= 0.7630

B= 0.9987

O= 0.0696 W=0.8818

B= 0.1280

Table 13: Correlation Coefficients Between Treatment Variables
LossofEarn TravelExp RecovLeave MedInsur Incent1
LossofEarn

1

TravelExp

0.8755

Incent2

ChildCare

1

RecovLeave 0.4475

-0.3918

1

MedInsur

0.5746

0.5031

-0.1820

1

Incent1

0.2892

0.2532

0.6462

0.5033

1

Incent2

0.3025

0.2649

-0.1943

0.5265

-0.1255

1

ChildCare

0.6102

0.5342

0.1483

-0.0616

-0.2532

-0.2649

1
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